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ABSTRACT
This work was undertaken in order to study the utilisation of decision
analysis interviews and of the RODOS system when planning protective
actions in the case of a nuclear accident. Six decision analysis interview
meetings were organised. Interviewees were competent national safety
authorities and technical level decision-makers, i.e., those who are
responsible for drawing up advice or making presentations of matters to
decision-makers responsible for the practical implementation of the actions.
The theme of the meetings was to study how uncertainties could be included
in the decision-making process and whether pre-structured generic
attributes and value trees would help this process and save time. The
approach was to present a generic value tree, a decision table and a selected
information package at the beginning of the interviews. The interviewees
then examined the suggested value tree in order to ensure that no
important factors have been omitted and they made changes when
necessary. Also, the decision table was examined and altered by some
participants and some of them asked for further information on some
issues. But all in all the selected approach allowed for more time and effort
to be allocated to value trade-offs and elicitation of risk attitudes. All
information was calculated with the support of the RODOS system.
Predefined value trees were found to ensure that all relevant factors are
considered. The participants also felt that RODOS could provide the required
information but, as in previous RODOS exercises, they found it more
problematic to use decision analysis methods when planning
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countermeasures in the early phase of a nuclear accident. Furthermore, it
was again noted that understanding the actual meaning of ‘soft’ attributes,
such as socio-psychological impacts, was not a straightforward issue.
Consequently, the definition of attributes and training in advance would be
beneficial. The incorporation of uncertainties also proved to be difficult and
participants felt uneasy about probabilities.
The application of decision analysis in exercises has proven useful.
Structuring the problem provided insight and many new issues could be
analysed and discussed. Using a decision interview technique forces
participants to think about the issue more carefully. Opinions seem to be
more coherent and harmonised compared with earlier decision conferencing.
Further meetings, however, need to be organised in order to deepen insight
into the features of the decision-making process and to familiarise decision-
makers with decision analysis techniques. More research is needed on how
to implement decision conferencing or interviews in nuclear emergency
management.
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1 INTRODUCTION
The varied response to the Chernobyl accident both in and beyond the
former Soviet Union above all demonstrated the need for generally accepted
procedures and models to ensure an integrated and coherent response to
possible future accidents. Therefore the European Commission
commissioned the development of RODOS, a Real-time On-line DecisiOn
Support system. This is designed to assess, present and predict the
consequences of an accident and to support decision-makers in choosing
appropriate countermeasures. See Ehrhardt and Weis (1997) or the RODOS
homepage at http://resy.fzk.de for a more detailed description of the
project.
The RODOS software is designed to be a decision support system for off-site
nuclear emergency management. This implies that RODOS must be capable of
supporting a wide variety of decisions-makers at several different stages of
an accident. The decision support provided is divided into four levels (Table
I).
On the first level RODOS merely organises the incoming data and presents it
to the decision-makers. Levels that provide an ever-increasing support
follow, ending at level 3, where RODOS interacts with the decision-makers,
helping them to explore and develop their judgements and evaluations. In a
sense RODOS provides decision-making support only at level 3, whereas on
the other levels it mostly organises and presents information (Ahlbrecht et
al, 1997).
As part of the RODOS project STUK arranged a series of decision conferences
in 1997. These conferences dealt with decision-making in the early phase of
a nuclear accident and were arranged in co-operation between STUK and the
System Analysis Laboratory (SAL), Helsinki University of Technology
(Hämäläinen et al. 1998). To embrace the decision-making process in the
later phases of an accident another series of decision conferences was
envisaged. The aim was to continue the work started with the first series of
conferences and, in particular, to study and apply decision analysis
techniques and the RODOS system in the decision-making of later phase
protective actions.
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Table I. Decision support can be provided at various levels (Ahlbrecht et al,
1997).
Level of decision support
Level 0 Acquisition and checking of radiological data and their presentation,
directly or with minimal analysis, to decision-makers, along with
geographical and demographic information available in a geographical
information system.
Level 1 Analysis and prediction of the current and future radiological situation
(i.e., the distribution over space and time in the absence of protective
actions) based upon monitoring and meteorological data and models.
Level 2 Simulation of potential protective actions (e.g., sheltering, evacuation,
issue of iodine tablets, food bans, and relocation), in particular
determination of their feasibility and quantification of their benefits and
disadvantages.
Level 3 Evaluation and ranking of alternative protective action strategies in the
face of uncertainty by balancing their respective benefits and
disadvantages (e.g. costs, averted dose, stress reduction, social and
political acceptability) taking account of societal value judgements as
perceived by decision-makers.
The first series of conferences reached their objectives in structuring the
decision problem, in value analysis, in demonstrating the role and value of
utility analysis in nuclear emergency management and in familiarising the
participants in the conferences with the concepts used in performing this
analysis. The primary approach was to use a decision conferencing format to
analyse early countermeasures.
The objectives of the first and second series of conferences are given in
Hämäläinen et al., 1998. However, given the novelty of the decision
conferencing approach in the radiation protection community, some
questions remained unresolved. There was also little time to concentrate on
the different aspects in this multi-stage process. For this reasons there was
a desire to complete the analysis, this time by approaching the problem with
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an interview technique and by tackling intrinsic uncertainties with other
methods than those used in the previous study. The interviews were held at
the beginning of 1999 and the results are presented in this report.
Two decision conferences are planned to extend the work commenced with
the interviews concerning early protective actions to the later phase of
decision-making. Both interviews and these two decision conferences are
based on the same accident scenario. All in all, three decision points are
envisaged. In the threat of a release or even during an ongoing release
urgent actions to protect humans, that is iodine prophylaxis, sheltering and
evacuation, are of major concern. The interviews documented in the present
report are concerned with this decision point. A first conference is meant to
deal with urgent measures to protect livestock during the first day following
an accident. A second one with follow-up and more extensive
countermeasures applicable to milk and dairy products at a time when the
fallout pattern and composition are measured.
Decisions on countermeasures are not only driven by the need to avert the
radiation dose to the population but are complex and multi-attribute
problems involving, for example, monetary costs and socio-psychological
factors, such as stress and anxiety. These decisions have far-reaching
consequences, but often have to be taken under severe time pressure and
conditions of uncertainty. Moral and ethical values held by decision-makers
and stakeholders are as important as the technical issues involved in the
consequences of an accident. Even some of the underlying assumptions in
neutral risk assessments may contain value judgements. This complex
situation thus places high demands on a DSS and on the decision-making
processes. It is important to be able to identify and process both factual
issues and value issues.
International organisations have published their recommendations for
generic intervention levels and in addition there are also recommended
values for the trade-off between costs and averted dose (EU Radiation
Protection 87, IAEA Safety Series No. 109). An important aim of the present
work is to explore deeper into the recommendations and to introduce
explicitly into the decision-making the values and beliefs held by the
decision-makers. What are the factors that need to be considered in the
decision-making process, what are the necessary value trade-offs, and how
should the uncertainties be modelled and accounted for?
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For previous work in the RODOS project, see e.g. Ahlbrecht et al (1997),
Bäverstam et al (1997), French (1996), French et al (1993, 1995) or
Hämäläinen et al (1998). The main findings from these have been that
decision conferencing is a promising way to analyse the problem and to
support the decision-making process. The structured approach offered by
multi-attribute risk analysis has been found useful. Good communication
and comprehensible presentations of the data and options are essential. The
use of utility theory for risk handling has been found difficult as the
participants have not been sufficiently familiar or comfortable with the
techniques used. Decision analysis techniques have also been used in related
areas such as environmental decisions and energy policies. Apostolakis and
Pickett (1998), Hämäläinen (1988, 1990, 1991, 1992), Hämäläinen and
Karjalainen (1992) and Keeney (1980) are examples of work in related fields.
In the present work decision analysis interviews were used. A decision
analysis interview is a one-to-one interactive process where the analyst
works individually with each decision-maker. Decision analysis interviews
have previously been used to increase stakeholders’ participation in
environmental decision-making (Marttunen and Hämäläinen, 1995).
This report is structured as follows. The legal and organisational decision-
making structure for nuclear emergency management in Finland is
described in Section 2. The RODOS system was used as far as possible to
assess the attributes that have to be considered when deciding between
different countermeasure strategies, for example, cancer cases and
monetary costs. Assessments of these ‘hard’ attributes were then assembled
in decision tables, which constituted the central part of an information
package presented to the participants. This is set out in Section 3. The
interviews, how they were conducted, the attribute tree, the decision table,
preference weighting, sensitivity analysis - all this is described in Section 4.
The findings are stated in Section 5. Section 6 reflects on the interviewees’
opinions on the usefulness of this particular decision analysis approach and
Section 7 gathers observations made throughout the interviews and their
analysis. As a pointer for future work, Section 8 outlines a model that would
be closer to the sequential nature of the real decision-making process. The
report ends with a more general discussion.
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2 NUCLEAR EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT
IN FINLAND
The basic principle in nuclear emergency management in Finland is that
each branch of administration is responsible for emergency responses and
preparedness arrangements in their own sector of authority. Hence each
ministry decides on countermeasures in their sector of authority and
presents matters to the Council of State in issues requiring political
commitment. The Ministry of the Interior is responsible for the overall co-
ordination of actions within the central government, especially in the early
phase of an accident. The information on which decisions are based and
organisations participating in decision-making may vary depending on the
phase of an accident.
The Act and Decree on radiological protection stipulates the general
principles to be taken into account in the protection of people against
ionisation radiation. In exceptional radiation situations the Ministry of the
Interior is responsible for planning, co-ordination, and overall leadership
when deciding on and implementing the urgent protective measures. Such
situations normally require measures based on other laws than the
Radiological Protection Act. The central Act in emergencies is the Act on
Rescue Services (which covers fire protection, rescue services and civil
protection).
In the acute phase of an accident the above Act stipulates the rights and
responsibilities of those who decide on and implement urgent protective
measures, such as sheltering of people, evacuation, decontamination and
other urgently needed actions described in the contingency plans.
These operations are led in domestic accidents by the regional fire chief
(regional co-operation for rescue purposes is organised between several
municipalities). All relevant local authorities are represented in the leading
group assisting the fire chief.
At the provincial level the provincial administration board (all relevant
sectors represented) and at the national level the Ministry of the Interior
can issue orders related to rescue operations, if necessary. A co-ordination
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group consisting of representatives from all relevant ministries and expert
organisations is set up by the Ministry of the Interior for the acute phase.
In the case of nuclear accidents abroad with transboundary contamination
the Ministry of the Interior leads the operation. The Ministry of the Interior
is also responsible for questions of international assistance and co-
ordination of emergency response by all relevant ministries and authorities.
In the acute phase it is the responsibility of the Ministry of Interior to co-
ordinate, both vertically and horizontally, the preparation of the decisions.
Later, in the aftermath of an emergency normal administrative practice is
resumed.
For decision-making all other relevant laws are valid and the corresponding
authorities are responsible for decisions in these sectors. Thus the
distribution of responsibilities is as follows:
The Ministry of Social Affairs and Health is responsible for the health
protection of the population (advice on iodine prophylaxis in the contingency
plans, control of drinking water, psychological aid, social support, medical
treatment etc.), and for providing logistics for evacuees.
The Ministry of Trade and Industry is responsible for food and trade
restrictions. Subordinated to this Ministry are the National Food
Administration Authority, which is responsible for food sold in retail stores,
and the National Emergency Supply Agency (HVK), which is responsible for
preparedness and planning of food supply under exceptional conditions.
The Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry is responsible for measures in
agriculture, forestry and fisheries, and for implementation of the
agricultural and fishing policy of the EU.
The Ministry of the Environment is responsible for housing of relocated
population groups and reclamation of contaminated land (waste from
decontamination).
Other relevant bodies and ministries in accident situations include the
Cabinet Information Unit, which co-ordinates the information activities. The
Ministry of Foreign affairs is responsible for issuing information to foreign
STUK-A173
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media on Finnish accidents and the Ministry of Transport and
Communication is responsible for communications (Finnish Broadcasting
Company), transport etc.
The cases studied in this report were conducted in co-operation with the
Radiation and Nuclear Safety Authority (STUK), which is the Regulatory
Body for radiological practices and nuclear safety and is subordinated to the
Ministry of Social Affairs and Health.
The duties of STUK regarding off-site management are inter alia: to assess
the radiation situation, to predict and assess radiation-related health
consequences and, as a safety authority, to give recommendations on
countermeasures to other authorities, and to perform radionuclide analyses.
The participants in the interviews were experts responsible for giving advice
to political decision-makers on appropriate countermeasures.
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3 ACCIDENT SCENARIO AND PROTECTIVE
ACTIONS
For the purpose of analysis it was assumed that a hypothetical core-
damaging and containment leak accident had occurred at the Olkiluoto
nuclear power plant in Finland, leading to contamination of the
environment. The chosen time of the accident was at the end of June, on a
working day. The probability of occurrence in real life of such a containment
failure accident leading to a significant release is estimated to be less than
one in 1,000,000 per reactor-year for this NPP.
There were many uncertainties in the event, but only uncertainties about
the release fractions were considered. A release was assumed to have
definitely happened and it was assumed that the weather for the next few
hours could be predicted1. Furthermore, the branch of the containment
event tree was identified and therefore the nuclear safety experts were able
to give probability distributions for the release. The 5%, 50% and 95%
fractiles of the cumulative distribution functions were used to encompass
the uncertain situation2. Based on these release fractions the probability
distributions of the impacts of the accident were calculated. The time of the
interviews was set when the release had just started and measurement data
were about to come in. Uncertainties in the dispersion calculation were not
included in the impact distributions.
The release scenario for the Olkiluoto nuclear power plant was based on a
containment failure classification. There were several possible containment
event tree branches in each containment failure group and the release
fractions given in Table II were due to one possible branch in the early
containment failure group. These values were based on an assessment of the
NPP’s and STUK’s nuclear safety experts. The progress of the accident was
described as follows:
                                                
1 Weather data were actually based on past on-site measurements.
2 The cumulative distribution gives the probability that a release magnitude is less or equal than the
particular magnitude.
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'The initiator is loss of external grid due to a minor earthquake at 06:00. The
same quake breaks the backup battery cabinets, since the batteries are very
heavy and the design of the cabinets did not take earthquakes into account3.
The automatic overpressure protection of the reactor is successful and the
hydraulic SCRAM succeeds. The containment is successfully isolated. The
overpressure protection valves close successfully. During the next 45
minutes, the auxiliary feedwater cannot be started and the manual pressure
reduction of the reactor fails. Thus the pressure cannot be lowered to the
operating range of the low pressure emergency cooling system.
50 minutes after the initiator, the core begins to melt under high pressure.
The pressure reduction of the vessel can be recovered before 90 minutes, so
the pressure of the vessel can be lowered. The core cooling systems cannot
be recovered before the end of the recriticality time window, so there is no
recriticality in the core. The flooding of the lower drywell (pedestal) is
successfully carried out before the vessel breach.
After 2 hours, the vessel breaches into water-filled containment and the
containment fails due to a corium spray hitting penetrations above the
water level. Thus, there is a direct path from the containment atmosphere
to the
 Table II. The Release fractions assumed for the hypothetical accident at
Olkiluoto, ‘early containment failure’. The release fractions are 5%, 50% and
95% fractiles of the containment failure groups cumulative distribution.
Nuclide group Release fraction
5% fractile 50% fractile 95% fractile
Noble gases 4.7×10-1 4.9×10-1 5.1×10-1
Iodine total 2.1×10-4 1.2×10-2 1.3×10-1
Alkaline-group (Cs, Rb) 2.0×10-4 9.2×10-3 1.1×10-1
Tellurium-group (Te, Se, Sb) 2.0×10-5 6.1×10-3 9.2×10-2
Alkaline earth-group (Sr, Ba) 3.4×10-6 3.1×10-4 3.1×10-2
Ruthenium-group (Ru, Mo, Tc) 1.1×10-7 3.7×10-6 1.6×10-3
Lanthanide-group La, Nb, Zr, Cm, Ce,
Nd, Pm, Sm, Eu, Pu, refr. Ox. Nb, Zr)
4.6×10-8 1.2×10-5 3.1×10-3
                                                
3 TVO has modified these cabinets recently.
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reactor building, bypassing the filter and stack. The reactor building
remains intact, and since it is very large, some deposition also occurs in the
reactor building. The corium remains under water.’ (Niemelä 1997)
In this accident up to a few tens’ percent of the fission products were
assumed to have been released into the environment. The release began two
hours after shutdown, at 08:00, and lasted for 12 hours. The release rate
was not constant, i.e. the initial intense release went down roughly
exponentially in 12 hours. The effective release height was 50 m, which
corresponded roughly to an initial sensible-heat release rate of a few
megawatts (the venting occurs at a height of 10 m).
It was assumed that this was the state of knowledge at about 08:00, when
the release had just started. The task of the participants was to decide on
countermeasures to protect the inhabitants of threatened municipalities.
The first information they needed was the area threatened and the
estimated arrival time of the plume in different municipalities (Figure 1). A
prediction of the radiological situation was also needed. In our case this
meant a forecast of accident consequences for each fractile of the source
term distribution. The calculations were made with the atmospheric
dispersion and deposition models of RODOS, e.g. PROGNOSE98/ATSTEP4. Models
within RODOS have a fixed computation grid, currently 40 x 40 grid elements.
In order to cover the whole area where urgent protective measures should
be considered, the resolution was set to 2 x 2 km2, corresponding to a
computation area of 80 x 80 km2. Figure 1 gives an impression of this
computation area.
Exposure of individual members of the public may be incurred by various
pathways. The dispersion and dose model takes into account external
irradiation from the passing plume and from ground deposits and internal
exposure from the inhalation of radioactive materials5. The projected dose
accumulated in the first hours or in a day (during the plume passage) was of
especial interest since it is the relevant quantity for expressing the risk of
                                                
4 PROGNOSE98/ATSTEP is a segmented Gaussian plume model for the atmospheric dispersion within
RODOS. It was used within this work to assess both activity concentrations and doses. But it also
fed subsequent models, e.g. the early emergency simulation model EMERSIM with time-series of
dose-rates.
5 The ingestion pathway is optionally added by the terrestrial food-chain and dose module FDMT.
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deterministic health effects. Furthermore, it allowed the derivation of the
avertable dose, which in turn is the relevant quantity for measuring the
benefit of countermeasures. For practical reasons we have chosen an
integration time of one day. All these doses were calculated under normal
living conditions, thus taking into account the shielding effect of houses.
The effective dose that incurs due to exposure to the afore-mentioned
pathways and the absorbed thyroid dose in children was computed and
included in an information package. Figures 2, 3 and 4 show the thematic
maps of the estimated effective doses for the three fractiles 95%, 50% and
5%, respectively.
The first concern for taking decisions on interventions is that all possible
efforts should be made to prevent serious deterministic health effects. The
projected dose to the highly exposed and radiosensitive groups should be
used as a predictor of the likelihood of these effects (Safety Series No. 109).
In our
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Figure 1. Elapsed time from the start of the release before the plume
reaches different locations.
scenario the highest doses were expected to occur at the seaside (see Figure
2). In inhabited areas thresholds for deterministic health effects were not
likely to be exceeded, not even with a source term corresponding to the 95%
fractiles.
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Figure 2. The spatial effective dose (mSv) distribution due to the 95%
fractile release scenario.
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Figure 3. The spatial effective dose (mSv) distribution due to the 50%
fractile release scenario.
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Figure 4. The spatial effective dose (mSv) distribution due to the 5%
fractile release scenario.
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The basic principles for taking decisions on interventions call for
justification and optimisation of the actions. Both can be accomplished by a
decision analysis, which was approached with the multi-attribute utility
theory (MAUT). In practice, protective actions have to be implemented in
well-defined areas which very likely correspond to administrative units.
Within this report municipalities were regarded as the basic administrative
units for intervention. Hence, benefits and harm introduced by protective
actions had to be aggregated within municipalities. Strategies were then
drawn up by telling which bundle of protective actions may be applied in
which municipality. Prerequisite for this procedure was to simulate
protective actions with the same time schedule everywhere throughout the
computation grid.
The early emergency simulation model EMERSIM of RODOS was used to assess,
in terms of doses and costs, the consequences of taking any protective
action. This model works primarily with action levels which, when exceeded,
mark the area whose population has to be protected. Alternatively,
intervention areas can be marked graphically. However, the prototype
version of RODOS used did not directly support the concept of municipalities.
This is why it was decided to simulate a protective action throughout the
computation grid with EMERSIM and aggregate data within municipalities by
tools coming with MAPINFO, a commercial GIS.
In each municipality any of the following single actions could be considered:
· no protective action;
· intake of stable iodine tablets before the plume arrival;
· sheltering before the plume arrives and throughout its passage;
· sheltering in combination with intake of stable iodine tablets;
· precautionary evacuation.
A countermeasure strategy could be drawn up by telling which option is
taken in each municipality. In the given scenario, within the computation
area there are 13 municipalities that are affected by the plume and hence
there are 513 possibilities of drawing up a strategy. This vast number had to
be drastically reduced in order to provide a manageable set for finding an
optimal strategy or to perform a decision analysis. This could be achieved by
screening out unfeasible, impractical and clearly mediocre ones, e.g. by
applying dose criteria and other constraints.
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The following constraints or rules could be applied when forming the
countermeasure strategies in this type of accident scenario:
In the threat phase of an accident the decision on protective action or
strategies to be implemented close to the site, will be based on plant status
since radioactive materials released from nuclear fuel can be quickly spread
to the environment. According to the Finnish NPP guide (YVL 7.4) ‘if the
estimates are that the plant transient leads to severe reactor damage, it is
recommendable to carry out evacuation in the plant vicinity in an area with
a ca. 5 km radius. In the same way, it is necessary to prepare for the intake
of stable iodine by intensifying or supplementing emergency preparedness,
if necessary. Gradual evacuation is recommendable at the latest when an
accident has reached a phase where a reactor core melt is assumed to have
occurred. It is advisable to carry out evacuation according to need in an area
extending to a ca. 20 kilometres' distance from the facility’.
Later, farther away from plant when uncertainty is reduced by
measurements or if we consider protection against radiation without
uncertainties, projected dose i.e. total dose to be expected if no action is
taken or intervention levels expressed as avertable dose, which will be
averted by a protective action, are radiological attributes in considering
actions or to be used as criteria.
According to the intervention levels published by the European Commission
in Radiation Protection 87 sheltering is generally recommended when ‘a few
to a few tens’ mSv is avertable and for evacuation the avertable dose should
be in the range of ‘a few tens to a few hundreds’ mSv. The corresponding
range for iodine prophylaxis is ‘some tens to a few hundred’ mGy avertable
dose to the thyroid. A straightforward application of internationally
recommended intervention levels in our context turned out to be
problematic. Looking at Table III it can be seen that, even for such a large
release as given by the 95% fractiles, the intervention levels for evacuation
are not exceeded in any municipality and those for sheltering only in
Merikarvia. The intake of iodine tablets would only be recommended in four
municipalities (Table IV). NB, it is assumed in calculations that iodine
prophylaxis is fully effective which is not the case in real life. Looking at
Figure 2 we gain a different picture. There, the intervention level for
sheltering is obviously exceeded in at least parts of
STUK-A173
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Table III. Average effective dose (mSv) within municipalities if the options
no action, issue of stable iodine tables, sheltering, iodine and sheltering or
evacuation were implemented. Values are based on the 95% release scenario.
Municipality Normal Living Iodine Sheltering Iodine &
Sheltering
Evacuation
Merikarvia 19,61 11,84 11,60 8,03 0,00
Luvia 5,97 3,70 3,56 2,51 0,00
Pori 4,70 2,88 2,80 1,96 0,00
Siikainen 4,64 2,98 2,86 2,11 0,00
Pomarkku 1,27 0,79 0,77 0,55 0,00
Noormarkku 1,16 0,72 0,69 0,49 0,00
Eurajoki 0,89 0,55 0,55 0,39 0,00
Kankaanpää 0,66 0,42 0,40 0,29 0,00
Ulvila 0,37 0,22 0,22 0,15 0,00
Jämijärvi 0,01 0,01 0,01 0,00 0,00
Kullaa 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00
Nakkila 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00
Lavia 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00
Table IV. Average thyroid dose in adults (mGy) within municipalities if the
options no action, issue of stable iodine tables, sheltering, iodine and
sheltering or evacuation were implemented. Values are based on the 95%
release scenario.
Municipality Normal Living Iodine Shelter Iodine &
Shelter
Evacuation
Merikarvia 258,95 0,00 155,37 0,00 0,00
Luvia 75,52 0,00 45,31 0,00 0,00
Pori 60,63 0,00 36,38 0,00 0,00
Siikainen 55,49 0,00 33,29 0,00 0,00
Pomarkku 16,03 0,00 9,62 0,00 0,00
Noormarkku 14,92 0,00 8,95 0,00 0,00
Eurajoki 11,23 0,00 6,74 0,00 0,00
Kankaanpää 7,93 0,00 4,76 0,00 0,00
Ulvila 4,90 0,00 2,94 0,00 0,00
Jämijärvi 0,12 0,00 0,07 0,00 0,00
Kullaa 0,05 0,00 0,03 0,00 0,00
Nakkila 0,01 0,00 0,01 0,00 0,00
Lavia 0,01 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00
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different municipalities. The reason for this discrepancy certainly lies in the
averaging process6 used to aggregate doses within municipalities.
In addition to intervention levels, feasibility of actions screens out a great
number of strategies. There were only two hours between SCRAM and the
start of the release and hence very little time to plan and implement
actions. Large population groups cannot be evacuated within this time. It
was assumed that only the relatively small municipalities closest to the site,
i.e., Eurajoki and Luvia, have a realistic chance of being evacuated in time.
In contrast, intake of stable iodine tables was not thought to pose a problem,
since in Finland residential units are obliged to keep iodine tables available
and small households are encouraged to purchase tablets. Also, sheltering
can be relatively easily implemented, given that the public can be informed
in due time before the rush to schools and workplaces starts.
Equality of treatment was also taken into consideration, another constraint.
In most circumstances, municipalities closer to the site should receive at
least the same level of protection as municipalities farther away.
Within the RODOS project, the course expert system CES has been developed
to cope with this constraint satisfaction problem (Papamichail and French,
1997). Nadia Papamichail tailored a stand-alone version of the CES for this
elicitation exercise to test its applicability. She adopted the concept of
municipalities and assumed that a countermeasure is applied throughout a
municipality. By applying the constraints the CES generated a manageable
set strategies, i.e. a set of municipalities and the actions taken there.
The effective dose and the thyroid dose for children were calculated as
background information for the participants. In Table III are given the
average effective doses within affected municipalities when the afore
mentioned countermeasures were applied (95% fractile release scenario).
Table IV presents similar values for the average thyroid dose7.
For the purpose of a detailed decision analysis six strategies were defined
and they are shown in Figure 5. They were developed by holistically applying
the constraints discussed above. Each protective action averts doses, but
countermeasures also imply monetary costs, put a burden on the people
                                                
6 Collective dose per capita within a municipality.
7 The thyroid dose for children is believed to be 2.2 times higher.
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affected, etc. Aggregating the potential effects of countermeasures within
the municipalities that participate in a strategy provides for the main
assessment of the ‘hard’ attributes of the decision table. For example, the
collective effective dose averted by a strategy is the sum of dose savings
that can be achieved within each of the participating municipalities. A
similar claim can be made, at least as a first approximation, for the number
of persons directly affected, or even for the costs that incur from
implementing the countermeasure. It is worth noting that the number of
people directly affected and the costs of implementing a afore mentioned
strategy are not dependent on the severity of the accident (see Tables V-
VII).
Tables V - VII show for the 95%, 50% and 5% fractiles, respectively, the
‘hard’ input to the preliminary decision table (Table VIII), which was finally
distributed to the interviewee. Collective doses are stated both as projected
doses and in terms of averted doses. Strategy 0 provides the baseline when
no actions are taken.
Other, non-radiological attributes that influence the decision on urgent
protective actions are dealt with in the next section. Also Hämäläinen et al.,
1998 gives a wider discussion on attributes and their definitions useful for
urgent protective action planning.
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Eurajoki
Luvia
Eurajoki
Luvia
Siikainen
Merikarvia
Pori
Pomarkku
Noormarkku
Kankaanpää
Siikainen
Merikarvia
Pori
Luvia
Eurajoki
Kankaanpää
Noormarkku
Pomarkku
Pori
Eurajoki
Luvia
Siikainen
Merikarvia
Noormarkku
Kankaanpää
Pomarkku
Siikainen
Merikarvia
Pori
Luvia
Eurajoki
Kankaanpää
Pomarkku
Siikainen
NoormarkkuPori
Eurajoki
Luvia
Merikarvia
Strategies
Iodine
Iodine and Shelter
Evacuation
1 2
3 4
5 6
Figure 5. Strategies for the decision analysis concerning urgent protective
actions. They are numbered 1 to 6 from the upper left to lower right.
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Table V. The performance of the strategies measured in terms of number of
people affected, costs, doses and cancers. Values are based on the 95%
release scenario.
STRATEGIES
Attribute 0 1 2 3 4 5 6
People in iodine area [No] 0 7740 81060 103401 103401 103401 95661
People in sheltering area [No] 0 0 0 7740 75469 81060 73320
People in evacuation area [No] 0 0 0 0 0 0 7740
Cost due to sheltering [MFIM] 0.0 0.0 0.0 1.9 18.1 19.5 17.6
Cost due to evacuation [MFIM] 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 13.1
PROJECTED
Collective thyroid dose [manSv] 5764.9 5460.7 345.0 99.3 99.3 99.3 99.3
Thyroid cancer deaths [No] 4.6 4.4 0.3 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1
Thyroid cancer incidence in
children [No]
47.6 45.1 2.8 0.8 0.8 0.8 0.8
Collective effective dose [manSv] 446.8 437.7 284.2 272.1 209.8 194.9 184.7
Other cancer deaths [No] 13.7 13.7 13.7 13.5 10.3 9.6 9.1
Other cancer incidence [No] 27.4 27.4 27.4 26.9 20.7 19.2 18.2
A V E R T E D
Collective thyroid dose [manSv] 0.0 304.2 5419.9 5665.6 5665.6 5665.6 5665.6
Thyroid cancer deaths [No] 0.0 0.2 4.3 4.5 4.5 4.5 4.5
Thyroid cancer incidence in
children [No]
0.0 2.5 44.7 46.7 46.7 46.7 46.7
Collective effective dose [manSv] 0.0 9.1 162.6 174.7 237.0 252.0 262.1
Other cancer deaths [No] 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.2 3.4 4.1 4.6
Other cancer incidence [No] 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.5 6.7 8.2 9.2
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Table VI. The performance of the strategies measured in terms of number of
people affected, costs, doses and cancers. Values are based on the 50%
release scenario.
STRATEGIES
Attribute 0 1 2 3 4 5 6
People in iodine area [No] 0 7740 81060 103401 103401 103401 95661
People in sheltering area [No] 0 0 0 7740 75469 81060 73320
People in evacuation area [No] 0 0 0 0 0 0 7740
Cost due to sheltering [MFIM] 0.0 0.0 0.0 1.9 18.1 19.5 17.6
Cost due to evacuation [MFIM] 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 13.1
PROJECTED
Collective thyroid dose [manSv] 528.3 500.4 31.6 9.1 9.1 9.1 9.1
Thyroid cancer deaths [No] 0.4 0.4 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Thyroid cancer incidence in
children [No]
4.4 4.1 0.3 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1
Collective effective dose [manSv] 40.6 39.7 25.7 24.4 16.9 15.1 14.2
Other cancer deaths [No] 1.2 1.2 1.2 1.2 0.8 0.7 0.7
Other cancer incidence [No] 2.5 2.5 2.5 2.4 1.7 1.5 1.4
A V E R T E D
Collective thyroid dose [manSv] 0.0 27.9 496.7 519.2 519.2 519.2 519.2
Thyroid cancer deaths [No] 0.0 0.0 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.4
Thyroid cancer incidence in
children [No]
0.0 0.2 4.1 4.3 4.3 4.3 4.3
Collective effective dose [manSv] 0.0 0.8 14.9 16.2 23.6 25.5 26.3
Other cancer deaths [No] 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.4 0.5 0.5
Other cancer incidence [No] 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.8 1.0 1.1
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Table VII. The performance of the strategies measured in terms of number
of people affected, costs, doses and cancers. Values are based on the 5%
release scenario.
STRATEGIES
Attribute 0 1 2 3 4 5 6
People in iodine area [No] 0 7740 81060 103401 103401 103401 95661
People in sheltering area [No] 0 0 0 7740 75469 81060 73320
People in evacuation area [No] 0 0 0 0 0 0 7740
Cost due to sheltering [MFIM] 0.0 0.0 0.0 1.9 18.1 19.5 17.6
Cost due to evacuation [MFIM] 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 13.1
PROJECTED
Collective thyroid dose [manSv] 9.1 8.7 0.5 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2
Thyroid cancer deaths [No] 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Thyroid cancer incidence in
children [No]
0.1 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Collective effective dose [manSv] 5.0 5.0 4.8 4.6 2.5 1.9 1.8
Other cancer deaths [No] 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.1 0.1 0.1
Other cancer incidence [No] 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.2 0.2 0.2
A V E R T E D
Collective thyroid dose [manSv] 0.0 0.5 8.6 9.0 9.0 9.0 9.0
Thyroid cancer deaths [No] 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Thyroid cancer incidence in
children [No]
0.0 0.0 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1
Collective effective dose [manSv] 0.0 0.0 0.3 0.5 2.6 3.1 3.3
Other cancer deaths [No] 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.1 0.2
Other cancer incidence [No] 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.2 0.3 0.3
STUK-A173
29
4 DECISION ANALYSIS INTERVIEWS
A decision analysis interview is a one-to-one interactive process where the
analyst works individually with each decision-maker. The personal
interviews help to ensure that the modelling is correctly done and that the
issues are understood correctly. Decision analysis interviews have
previously been used to increase stakeholders’ participation in
environmental decision-making (Marttunen and Hämäläinen, 1995).
The interviews all had a common structure. See Figure 6 for an overview of
the process. The participants in this study consisted of six persons; 4
radiation safety experts, 1 psychologist familiar with nuclear emergency
management and 1 decision analysis expert. The group of people was
selected to represent a variety of viewpoints, but being closely enough
involved in nuclear emergency management issues to possess the necessary
background information and experience.
The interviews were conducted on a one-to-one basis and computer software
was used for the value elicitations and to calculate the results. The
interviews lasted on average about two hours. After the elicitation process
the ranking was shown and discussed. If anything unexpected was found, it
was further examined. Sensitivity analyses were performed and at the end
of the interview the participants were asked to fill in a questionnaire.
The accident scenario and countermeasure strategies described in the
previous section were prepared in advance by the work group and shown to
the participants at the beginning of the interview. In addition to numerical
tables (see Tables II – IV), graphical maps (see Figures 1 - 5) were shown to
illustrate the issues. An expert group was also available to answer any
questions that the participants had about the accident.
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Defining accident
- scenario
- countermeasure strategies
Constructing preliminary value
hierarchy
Calculating preliminary data set
Choice of participants
Preparations before
interviews
Describing accident
- accident scenario
- countermeasure strategies
- preliminary value tree
- preliminary data set
Making requested changes
Eliciting risk attitudes through
lotteries
Eliciting preferences with
SMART
Showing resulting ranking
Sensitivity analyses
- single factor
- intervals
Questionnaire
Analysis of results
Reporting results
Interviews
Reporting
Figure 6. Stages of decision analysis interviews.
A preliminary value tree (see Figure 7), constructed using experiences
gained in earlier exercises (Hämäläinen et al 1998), was also shown and
discussed.
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Thyroid
cancer
Other
cancers
Health
Reassur-
nceance
Anxiety
Social
disruption
Socio-
Psychological
Costs
OVERALL
Figure 7. Preliminary value tree shown to participants.
The attributes suggested and their definitions are as follows:
Number of Thyroid cancer incidents in children and number of Other cancer
incidents. Stochastic health effects are likely to occur if large population
groups are exposed to radiation, even though the individual doses were
quite small. These two attributes could also be measured as projected
collective dose to the public (manSv) or as the number of cancer deaths
caused by the accident. Mortality is different, though. Whereas it is believed
that about 10% of the thyroid cancer incidence result in death this fraction
is about 50% for other cancer incidence. Thus depending on the choice of
unit, different impressions of the accident are given.
Reassurance of the population (positive effects). In the long run, appropriate
and reasonable extensive actions may reassure the people living in the
affected area. Especially measures that people can implement themselves
are most effective in reducing stress (direct rating).
Anxiety of the population (negative effects). A majority of the persons living
in the contaminated area may show varying degrees of stress reactions in
response to an accident. But stress may also be introduced by the protective
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actions. The severity of an accident will also be perceived through the
protective measures taken (direct rating).
Social disruption (negative effects). Disruptions in the social network, e.g.,
when evacuation or relocation is taken (direct rating).
Monetary Costs (EURO). The sum of direct and indirect costs of protective
actions. Cancer treatment costs and losses to GDP caused by fatalities should
not be included in this attribute in order to avoid double counting, i.e. not to
convert cancers into costs.
A list of other possible attributes was also shown; statistical non-radiation
fatalities, individual non-radiation fatalities, dose to the workers, anxiety of
the workers, feasibility. It was explained that these attributes had been
excluded from list as not being of major concern for the decision, already
accounted for (all strategies were considered equally feasible), or not
possible to incorporate meaningfully into the analysis (individual non-
radiation fatalities).
It was, however, also pointed out that this was a preliminary value tree and
that changes were possible. In all cases the attributes were discussed and in
one case a change was made (see the next section for the results).
Based on the accident scenario and countermeasure strategies the possible
outcomes had been estimated. For each strategy the outcome for each of the
six attributes was given (see Table VIII). All three fractiles, i.e. 5%, 50% and
95%, were considered. The number of cancer incidents and costs had been
assessed with the RODOS software. The preliminary values for ‘soft’
attributes were assessed by the work group, but the participants were asked
to consider if changes were needed to those outcomes assessed by direct
rating.
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Table VIII. Decision table.
STRATEGIES
Unit 0 1 2 3 4 5 6
Thyroid cancer incidents 5% No 0.1 0.1 0 0 0 0 0
50% No 4.4 4.1 0.3 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1
95% No 47.6 45.1 2.8 0.8 0.8 0.8 0.8
Other cancer incidents 5% No 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.2 0.2 0.2
50% No 2.5 2.5 2.5 2.4 1.7 1.5 1.4
95% No 27.4 27.4 27.4 26.9 20.7 19.2 18.2
Reassurance 5% 0-100 0 30 40 40 40 40 40
50% 0-100 0 20 30 40 50 60 60
95% 0-100 0 40 50 60 80 100 100
Anxiety 5% -100-0 0 -30 -50 -60 -80 -80 -100
50% -100-0 0 -10 -20 -30 -60 -60 -80
95% -100-0 0 0 -10 -20 -40 -40 -60
Social disruption all -100-0 0 0 0 0 0 0 -100
Costs all MFIM 0 0 0 1.9 18.1 19.5 30.7
After requested changes to the value tree and the outcomes had been made,
the forms of the utility functions were assessed using lotteries (see Figure
8). Two options were presented, an exact outcome and an option where
there was a 50-50 chance of receiving the worst or best level. By iteration
the indifference points were established. To provide a further explanation of
what was asked, the following example was given. “Imagine that you have
two methods of treating the patients. An old and well-known method that
you know will help some people, but still result in exactly 23.8 incidents
(alternative A). Then there is a new, advanced method (alternative B) which,
if it works, will cure all patients. However, the method has not been tested
and there is only a fifty-fifty chance that it will work. If it does not work,
then you will have 47.6 incidents. Which method do you prefer?”
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Option 1
• Exactly 23.8 incidents
of thyroid cancer
Option 2
• 50% chance of 0 incidents
• 50 % chance of 47.6 incidents
Utility
Thyroid cancer (incidents)
1
0
0 47.6
Selected Point -- Level: Utility:23.8 0.5
Figure 8. Type of lottery question asked to elicit utility functions.
The preference weights were elicited with the SMART8 technique (von
Winterfeldt and Edwards 1986). It was done in a hierarchical manner with a
top-down approach. That is, first the weights for the higher level attributes
were elicited (see Figure 9) and then the weights for the lower level
attributes. Figure 10 contains an example of ranking.
Health 
Socio-Psychological
Costs 
Least
Preferred
Level
47.6 &
27.4
0 &
-100 &
-100
30.7
Most
Preferred
Level
0 &
0
100 &
0 &
0
0
Swing
Weight
(100 = most imp.)
100
20
70
Figure 9. Example of value elicitation using SMART.
                                                
8  In the SMART technique the weights are calculated by ranking the importance of the changes in
the attributes from the worst attribute level to the best level and then by giving the least important
attribute a score of 10 and the rest of the attributes a scoring relative to that.
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Alternative
Strategy 2
Strategy 3
Strategy 1
Strategy 0
Strategy 4
Strategy 5
Strategy 6
Utility
 0.971
 0.935
 0.872
 0.855
 0.767
 0.763
 0.634
Thyroid cancer Costs Social disruption
Other cancers Reassurance Anxiety
Figure 10. Example of ranking.
The sensitivity analyses were performed using two different approaches.
First, conventional single factor sensitivity analyses were done to check the
robustness of the ranking. See Figure 11 for an example. A new type of
sensitivity analysis using intervals was also demonstrated. For this part
another software, called WINPRE (downloadable at
http://www.hut.fi/Units/SAL/Downloadables/), which allows intervals, was
used. The software includes an interval version of the SMART procedure. This
is a special case of PAIRS (Preference Assessment by Imprecise Ratio
Statements) and can be called simple PAIRS = SPAIRS (Salo and Hämäläinen
1992).
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Utility
Percentage of Weight on Health
Best
Worst
0 100
Strategy 2
Strategy 3
Strategy 1
Strategy 0
Strategy 4
Strategy 5
Strategy 6
Figure 11. Example of single factor sensitivity analyses.
Using intervals in sensitivity analyses allows for applying variance
simultaneously to more than one factor. For example, by saying that the
score for the attribute Health is 100, the score for Socio-Psychological is at
least 20 but no more than 60, and that the score for Costs is at least 10 but
no more than 60 (see Figure 12). Such an approach leads to intervals in the
weights and the utilities of the alternatives (see Figure 13). If there are
dominated alternatives, these can safely be discarded as truly worse
alternatives. If there are more than one non-dominated alternative left
after such an analysis, these need to be further examined. Using intervals in
sensitivity analyses thus reveals how the total sum of the imprecision
affects the ranking.
Figure 12. Example of using intervals for sensitivity analyses.
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Figure 13. Example of results from intervals in sensitivity analyses.
STUK-A173
38
5 RESULTS OF INTERVIEWS
The value tree in Figure 7 was shown to all participants and generally it was
considered appropriate in this case. One participant felt that money was not
an issue, but this could be taken into account by assigning a weight of zero
to the Costs attribute. Another participant felt that the attribute Anxiety
needed to be split into two. This was accomplished by changing the value
tree. As hierarchical weighting was used, the splitting of the value tree
should not affect the weights of the upper level attributes. But the weights
for the other lower level Socio-Psychological attributes might be affected,
see e.g. Borcherding and von Winterfeldt (1988) and Pöyhönen and
Hämäläinen (1998) for more information about the splitting bias.
Some changes in the attribute data were also made. The hard attributes, i.e.
the number of cancer incidents and the costs, were kept as they were, but
the Socio-Psychological attributes were changed in some cases. See Table
IX for a list of the changes. Especially the changes in the attribute Social
disruption show that there was disagreement about how it should be
interpreted. It was suggested that Social disruption be understood as the
disturbance in the social network caused by evacuation. Thus the attribute
received –100 when there was evacuation and 0 otherwise. But some
participants argued that all strategies cause social disruption and that there
are differences between the strategies that need to be considered. The
changes that some participants made are shown in Table IX.
As described in Section 4, the risk attitudes were elicited with lotteries (see
Figure 8). In Table X are given the risk attitudes of the interviewees. In
most cases the shape of the utility function was left linear for both the
Socio-Psychological attributes and the Costs attribute. For the Health
attributes it was, however, changed. From Table X it can be seen that half
the participants were risk averse and half were risk seeking. This is a result
that needs to be further examined. A possible explanation might be that
some saw the case as an oppoturnity to save lives (a gain situation) and
some saw it as a risk of losing lives (a loss situation). People are often risk
seeking when it comes to losses and risk averse when it comes to gains
(Kahneman and Tversky 1979).
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Table IX. Changes in the decision table
STRATEGIES
Unit 0 1 2 3 4 5 6
D1:
Reassurance all 0-100 0 5 10 20 30 40 100
Anxiety  - property all -100-0 0 0 0 0 0 0 -100
Anxiety -  health 5% -100-0 -10 0 0 0 0 0 0
50% -100-0 -20 -19 -18 -17 -16 -15 -10
95% -100-0 -100 -95 -94 -93 -92 -91 -90
Social disruption all -100-0 0 0 0 -1 -10 -15 -100
D3:
Reassurance 5% 0-100 0 30 40 40 40 40 40
50% 0-100 0 30 40 40 50 60 60
95% 0-100 0 40 50 60 80 80 100
Social disruption all -100-0 0 -5 -10 -30 -40 -50 -100
D6:
Social disruption all -100-0 0 -10 -15 -20 -25 -30 -100
The preferences were elicited with SMART, see Section 4. The scores for the
attributes are given in Table XI and the resulting weights in Table XII. As
can be seen from the tables, all participants considered the health effects
most important. But there were differences of opinion as to whether the
Thyroid cancer attribute or the Other cancers attribute was more
important. Three issues might lead to this difference. First, the range of
Thyroid cancer incidents and Other cancer incidents is quite different (see
Table VIII). Secondly, there is a difference in risk factors. It was assumed
that 10% of the thyroid cancer incidents lead to death, but 50% of other
cancers. That is, there is a significant difference whether you consider
cancer incidents or cancer deaths. Finally, the time factor is an important
issue. Thyroid cancers appear relatively soon after the accident, but other
types of cancer occur in many cases decades after the accident. Is a cancer
case, say, in 20 years’ time as important as a cancer case today?  If not, how
this can be accounted for?
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Table X. Risk attitudes (utility for midpoint if not linear). A refers to the
original value tree, B1 and B2 to the tree where the Anxiety attribute was
split into two attributes.
Upper level Lower level D 1 D 2 D 3 D 4 D 5 D 6
Health
Thyroid cancer 0.6 0.73 0.36 0.40 0.36 0.61
Other cancers 0.6 0.68 0.34 0.42 linear 0.64
Socio-psycho
Reassurance linear Linear linear linear linear linear
A Anxiety Linear linear 0.41 linear linear
B1 Anxiety-property linear
B2 Anxiety-health linear
Social disruption linear Linear linear linear linear linear
Costs linear 0.37 linear linear - linear
The Social disruption attribute received the full score in all cases. But there
were differences as to whether the other Socio-Psychological attributes
were as important or not. From Table XII can also be seen the effect of the
splitting bias. D1 and D5 both gave equal scores to all Socio-Psychological
attributes. But with D1 there were four attributes and with D5 there were
only three. For D5 the three original attributes received equal weight. For
D1 the splitting of the attribute Anxiety into two components led to its
receiving twice as much weight as the other two attributes.
In no case does the Costs attribute receive much weight. One participant
saw it as the second important upper level attribute and one participant
gave it zero weight. The reasons for assigning zero weight to it should be
examined further. Is it just because the costs are rather small in this
particular case, or is there a more fundamental difference of opinion?
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Table XI. Eliciting preferences with SMART/SWING, hierarchical weighting.
A refers to the original value tree, B1 and B2 to the tree were the Anxiety
attribute was split into two attributes.
Upper level Lower level D 1 D 2 D 3 D 4 D 5 D 6
Health 100 100 100 100 100 100
Thyroid cancer 50 100 100 100 80 35
Other cancers 100 10 80 100 100 100
Socio-psycho 40 20 70 50 50 60
Reassurance 100 20 30 30 100 35
A Anxiety 20 30 60 100 80
B1 Anxiety-property 100
B2 Anxiety-health 100
Social disruption 100 100 100 100 100 100
Costs 10 40 20 30 0 20
Table XII. The weights of the attributes. A refers to the original value tree,
B1 and B2 to the tree where the Anxiety attribute was split into two
attributes.
Upper level Lower level D 1 D 2 D 3 D 4 D 5 D 6
Health 0.67 0.62 0.53 0.56 0.67 0.56
Thyroid cancer 0.22 0.91 0.56 0.50 0.44 0.26
Other cancers 0.44 0.09 0.44 0.50 0.56 0.74
Socio-psycho 0.27 0.12 0.10 0.28 0.33 0.33
Reassurance 0.07 0.14 0.19 0.16 0.33 0.16
A Anxiety 0.14 0.19 0.32 0.33 0.37
B1 Anxiety-property 0.07
B2 Anxiety-health 0.07
Social disruption 0.07 0.71 0.62 0.53 0.33 0.46
Costs 0.07 0.25 0.37 0.17 0 0.11
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In Table XIII are given the resulting rankings and utilities of the
countermeasure strategies. From the table it can be concluded that
occasionally a third decimal is needed to separate strategies. Thus the
ranking would seem to be rather sensitive to small changes in the model.
When looking at the table Strategy 2 is the best choice for D2, D3, D4 and
D6 and hence a possible choice of the group. Strategies 3 and 5 are possible
alternatives. There is, however no full consensus on the best choice of
strategy and therefore it would be useful to discuss in a brief meeting
whether Strategy 2 is truly the more preferred choice, or whether the group
would like to make small changes in the model, making e.g. Strategy 3 more
preferred.
Table XIII. Ranking and utility of the countermeasure strategies.
D1 D2 D3 D4 D5 D6
Strategy 0 6 0.76 4 0.86 4 0.78 4 0.80 7 0.69 2 0.71
Strategy 1 5 0.77 3 0.87 3 0.78 3 0.81 5 0.72 3 0.70
Strategy 2 4 0.82 1 0.97 1 0.87 1 0.87 4 0.80 1 0.71
Strategy 3 2 0.82 2 0.93 2 0.84 2 0.86 3 0.81 4 0.70
Strategy 4 3 0.82 5 0.77 5 0.65 5 0.77 2 0.81 6 0.69
Strategy 5 1 0.83 6 0.76 6 0.63 6 0.77 1 0.83 5 0.70
Strategy 6 7 0.73 7 0.63 7 0.46 7 0.55 6 0.70 7 0.57
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6 QUESTIONNAIRE
Immediately after the interview the participants were given a questionnaire.
The questions and answers are set out in Table XIV. From the table it can be
seen that there was general agreement on the importance of considering
many factors in the process and of explicitly considering uncertainties.
However, the appropriateness of using decision analysis techniques was not
that clear.
The main software used in the interviews received a slightly positive
verdict. There were some questions about whether the software assumes too
much and limits the options.
A very interesting question is the time factor, i.e. that thyroid and other
cancers occur at different times. From the table it can be seen that D1, D5,
and D6 did not consider this fact at all, while the others considered it at
least to some extent. These three are also the same three that gave more
weight to the Other cancers attribute (see Table XI). That is, there is a clear
correlation between assigning weight to the cancer attributes and whether
the time factor was considered or not.
Sensitivity analyses were seen as somewhat useful and intervals as slightly
better than single factor analyses. The fact that sensitivity analyses are not
seen as very important and as not increasing the credibility raises a number
of questions. Do the participants feel that the results are robust and that
sensitivity analyses are not needed, or do they feel that the ranking is
anyway only indicative and other methods should be used to decide on the
final decision?
Including uncertainties is a very difficult issue. In this exercise three
fractiles were given and the participants seemed to like this approach.
Other possible approaches in the Table divided opinions rather equally, with
the approach mean-value-only gaining more negative response. A little
worrisome is the fact that everybody agreed on the importance of
considering risks explicitly, but still some participants did not see any
problems with using only mean values. Perhaps this is an indication that the
theory behind the approaches is not that clear to the participants.
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Table XIV. Questionnaire, the numbers in the answer cells refer to the
decision-makers, e.g. a 1 means that D1 chose this answer.
Decision Analysis Interviews 1
LL
2
L
3
K
4
J
5
JJ
How appropriate is this type of decision analysis in
connection with countermeasure decisions?
26 5 14 3
How important is it to consider other factors also, in addition
to costs and cancer incidents?
1245 36
How much did you take into consideration that different
impacts happen at different times, for example thyroid cancer
vs other cancers?
156 3 24
How important is it explicitly to consider the uncertainties in
the analyses when deciding on countermeasures?
5 2346 1
How much does the approach used by Logical Decision (first
software) help you consider the uncertainties?
3 156 4 2
How useful is the type of single factor sensitivity analysis
provided by Logical Decision?
2356 14
How much would the interval approach used by Winpre
(second software) increase the credibility of the results?
26 4 15
How useful is it to do sensitivity analyses, i.e. do they provide
more information about the situation?
56 234 1
Which type of sensitivity analysis would you prefer
(single factor <- -> intervals)
12 3456
How appropriate would the following ways be to handle
uncertainties?
-   use three equally distributed fractiles, for example 5%,
50% ,95%
13456 2
-   use only mean values, i.e. 50% fractile 35 14 6 2
-   use one fractile, but compensate for risk, for example 75%
fractile
136 2 45
-   use probability distributions and utility functions to capture
risk attitudes
34 56 12
-   use one fractile and intervals around it to incorporate
uncertainties
6 124 35
How well did the ranking of the alternatives from the analysis
compare with your own a priori ranking?
6 35 124
In most cases the ranking compared well with the a priori opinion that the
participants had about the strategies. For D6 the difference was caused by
differences in opinion about the definitions and measuring of the Socio-
Psychological attributes. From Table XIII it can be seen that small changes
in the model were sufficient completely to alter the ranking.
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7 OBSERVATIONS ON INTERVIEWS
The first observation that can be made from these interviews is that
decision analysis interviews are a suitable approach for training and for
planning in advance purposes. The personal interview allows for a deeper
understanding of the issues involved and the tools used. It clearly shows
where views differ and points out issues for further discussion.
The presentation of data is a very important aspect of the process. The
graphical maps used in these exercises are a possible way to communicate
the decision situation. Especially the map of the countermeasure strategies
was seen as very informative. At a single glance the participants were able
to assess the magnitude of the countermeasure strategies. The maps can,
however, still be improved. The location of, for example, the city centre of
Pori was not really clear from the maps. As found in previous exercises (see
e.g. Hämäläinen et al 1998), the chosen colour schemes might also affect the
impression gained by the decision-makers concerning the severity of the
accident.
The use of fractiles is a problematic matter. Here the 5%, 50% and 95%
fractiles were shown to the participants. During the interviews, however, it
became, apparent that not all participants were able to grasp the meaning of
the fractiles. In addition, the choice of fractiles is not a straightforward
matter.
As can be seen from Figures 14 and 15 the increase in cancer incidence is
not a linear function of fractiles. Thus it becomes important to know at
which point the curve becomes steeper. In the current case it would seem to
be around the 70% fractile. The ideal case would be to have the continuous
distributions for all attributes. Then graphs such as the one estimated in
Figure 16 could be used to show the participants how the uncertainties
affect the choices. From the figure it can be seen that Strategies 0 and 1
receive a high utility as long as the scale of the accident remains small, but
that the utilities drop rapidly when the accident becomes more severe. The
other accidents are much less sensitive to changes in the severity of the
accident. This is an important observation to consider when deciding on how
much risk one is willing to take. However, as was seen in the answers to the
questionnaire (Section 6), the participants were not totally comfortable with
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continuous distributions. If this is the case, then appropriate fractiles could
be picked from the continuous distribution. If continuous distributions are
not available, then more than three fractiles need to be calculated, for
example 5%, 25%, 50%, 75%, and 95%. Or preferably interactively those
fractiles requested by the decision-makers. This places a high demand on
the computational abilities of the system, but should perhaps be
investigated.
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Figure 14. Cumulative distribution function for the number of thyroid
cancer incidents in children for different strategies.
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Other cancer incidents [No]
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Figure 15. Cumulative distribution function for the number of other cancers
for different strategies.
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Figure 16. Estimated effect of the uncertainties on the utilities of the
alternative strategies for decision-maker 3.
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Some of the participants also had comments about the actions and
attributes chosen since certain important issues were not included in the
analysis. For example, the problem of informing the public was not
considered. Can the public be informed in time, will people understand and
follow the advice, will there be additional sources of false and misleading
information, etc? What are the likely reactions of the public, how will they
interpret the situation, and what consequences will there be if certain
actions are taken? Thus there were uncertainties not only about the
magnitude of the accident but also about the feasibility and effectiveness of
the countermeasures and about the reactions and actions of the part of
population.
Also, the issue of flexibility is an important one, something that was not
considered. Can the strategy be altered later? How much later? If a certain
countermeasure fails, are there alternative courses of actions open? One
participant pointed out that the implementation of countermeasures takes
more time than was assumed in the scenario. Evacuating the proximity of
the power plant, i.e. the closest 5 km, takes 4 hours. Thus it might be
argued that the suggested countermeasure strategies were not 100%
feasible, at least not in the eyes of all participants.
Some actions that would be taken, such as access control to the area, were
also not included. In addition, one participant stated that the city of Rauma
would always be included in any strategy. Another participant felt that
deterministic issues such as traffic accidents need to be included in the
analysis, although in previous exercises these have been found not to have
an impact on the final decision (Hämäläinen et al 1998).
The appropriateness of using a single decision point can thus be questioned.
Perhaps a more realistic approach would be to have a series of decisions. At
first the immediate actions would be decided upon. Later, when there is
more information about the accident, additional countermeasures could be
deployed. An example of such an approach is described in Section 8.
Overall, the procedures of value tree analysis were not completely clear to
all participants. The format of decision analysis interviews allowed for
clarifying the points at issue, but more training in general decision analysis
techniques is needed if the decision-makers are fully to understand the
process.
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The value tree shown to the participants was constructed from the
experiences gained in previous exercises. The attributes were defined and
the definitions were explained. However, some attributes, such as the socio-
psychological factors, still need more clarification. What exactly is meant by
them and how are they measured? One suggestion made was that categories
could be used instead of numerical values. For example, very bad – bad –
neutral – good - very good. This does not, however, address the problem of
defining the time window. Should only immediate reactions be assessed, or
also attitudes long after the accident?
The attributes chosen were also examined. The attribute Anxiety was seen
as problematic by one participant. The reason was that the accident is sure
to happen, so there will be anxiety anyway. No study has been made as to
whether there really is any difference in the amount of anxiety between the
different strategies. The Individual dose attribute was not used in decision
analysis. Individual doses were given as the thematic maps to participants
(Figures 2 - 4) which might have caused that no participant considered it
explicitly or wanted to add it into analysis. As being important in the
decision it needs to be considered and studied how the trade-off between
individual and collective doses should be done.
In the interviews cancer cases were measured by the number of cancer
incidents. As mentioned previously, this is not a straightforward choice. The
number of deaths or doses could also be used. A suggestion was made that
perhaps separate analyses should be performed with the different units of
measurement.
The most difficult part of the analysis was the elicitation of the risk
attitudes. In the interviews lottery questions were asked to establish the
form of the utility functions. As can be seen from Table X, half of the
participants were risk averse and the other half risk seeking. This can
partly be attributed to the framing effect, i.e. some participants might have
seen the situation as a loss situation and others as a gain situation. But in
addition it was clear that most participants had problems grasping the idea
of the utility function. Thus the answers might not mirror their true
opinions. Using lotteries seems too abstract and the questions seem too
difficult for decision-makers to be able to give meaningful answers. Even if
the framing effect were be eliminated, it is not clear that this type of
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approach is appropriate. Thus it would seem that alternative ways of
incorporating risks should be examined.
Two types of bias became apparent during the interviews. As described
earlier, the splitting bias was evident. This means that care needs to be
taken when building the value tree. In addition, this implies that a
hierarchical type of weighting might be more suitable, as the upper level
weights then stay the same even if a lower level attribute is split. The time
factor is also important. The interviews showed that the choice of time
frame affected the weights on the cancer attributes. The same effect might
also easily occur in other attributes, for example for the socio-psychological
attributes. Thus the discounting of attributes should be explicitly brought
into the analysis. That is, decision-makers should be explicitly asked how
they would like to take the time factor into consideration.
Last, the accident case used revealed an interesting difference in how the
uncertainties affect the values of the attributes and thus also the
recommended alternative. Figures 14 and 15 show the estimated
consequences of the accident for continuous distributions of the two cancer
attributes. Figure 16 contains the estimated utilities for D3 for continuous
distribution. As can be seen from the first figures, the uncertainties affect
the attributes in different way. For the attribute Other cancers the
uncertainties affect all strategies similarly, i.e. the curves are similar. But
for the attribute Thyroid cancer there is a difference. The curves for
Strategies 0 and 1 have similar shapes as the curves for the attribute Other
cancers. But the Strategies 2 - 6 curves are more or less linear throughout
the range. In the last figure the total utilities of the alternatives are plotted.
As can be seen, the utilities for Strategy 0 and 1 drop much more rapidly
than the others. Thus it could be argued that although the 50% fractile
values are about the same, Strategy 0 and 1 should be discarded as having a
much higher variance. This issue is not explicitly considered in the analysis.
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8 DECISION TREE
Another type of approach that could be considered is to split the decision
into several phases. What the decision points would be would vary
depending on the accident scenario. Figure 17 contains an example of how
the decision on countermeasures could be split into two decision points. In
the example it is assumed that the first decision as to what
countermeasures should be deployed would be taken immediately when it
becomes evident that an accident is about to happen. At this point actions
for the nearest areas would be decided upon and plans made for the areas
further away from the power-plant. When more information becomes
available about the severity of the accident, i.e. which fractile is relevant, an
appropriate countermeasure can be implemented in the outer areas. Thus
some of the uncertainties can be eliminated by delaying some of the
implementations until more precise information about the accident is
available.
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Figure 17. Example of decision tree.
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For purposes of simplicity the decision tree contains only two decision
points with two respectively three twigs. To capture the whole set of
possible states a more refined decision tree is needed. However, the same
principles apply in both cases.
At the second decision point value tree analyses would be performed for
each of the six possible states. Thus each state would be assigned a
countermeasure strategy and the utility resulting from that strategy. Then
by using the likelihood of each possible state the second decision point can
be collapsed to two points, each with an expected utility. Thus at decision
point one the branch with the higher expected utility should be chosen.
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9 DISCUSSION
The accident scenario used in the interviews was a hypothetical nuclear
accident. The setting and description of the accident scenario were as
detailed and realistic as possible and the participants were people
responsible for planning and in charge that aspect of the decision-making.
The whole decision-making situation can be said to have been quite close to
a real-life situation. Therefore it can be concluded that the experiences and
results obtained from the decision analysis interviews have a high degree of
reliability. At the same time it should be remembered that some
simplifications had to be made during the simulation of the events, a fact
that might reduce the degree of realism.
A general finding from the interviews is that it is very useful to arrange
interviews. They are suitable for training and for planning in advance
purposes on early phase issues. Personal interviews allow for a deeper
understanding of the issues involved and the tools used. It clearly reveals
where views differ and points to issues for further discussion.
As in previous studies, predefined value trees were found to be very useful.
They help the decision-maker to consider all relevant factors and to focus on
the most important ones. Later it is also easier to explain what has been
done and why it was done. A generic value tree could thus be pre-
programmed into RODOS: the decision-makers could examine the tree, pick
the relevant attributes, and then continue from there, thus saving time.
Some issues still need more research. As in earlier decision conferences, it
was found that factors and wordings are a source of misunderstandings.
There is a clear need to define the attributes in advance so that the persons
involved understand their meaning. Also, examples and studies, especially
on socio-psychological factors, are needed, e.g. using a ‘role playing’ method
for different types of action.
Practical consideration of protective measures is an important issue. How to
define the geographical area where people will be protected or how to apply
collective dose and/or individual dose criteria in practice? Sheltering or
issuing iodine tablets could be considered, but to whom? Can these actions
be implemented only with regard to children and will the adults comply with
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this? In a real situation people will not or cannot follow the
recommendations. All countermeasures need further examination in terms
of their feasibility. What are the consequences to individuals, industry and
society? What are monetary costs of actions?
A very important question is what the decision-makers want from the
software, what type of information and in what form? The decision table
given (Table VIII) provides information in compact form and was readily
accepted by the participants. This table together with some thematic maps
such as individual dose distribution, countermeasure strategies etc., could
form an appropriate information package in the early phase. In addition,
some further information should be ready if requested, such as plume
arrival time, cancer distribution and tabular information as was provided in
Tables II - VII. The appropriateness of these information packages should,
however, be tested elsewhere, too.
In conclusion, it can be said that the participants seemed to feel that the
RODOS software produces a lot of valuable information, e.g., on the
effectiveness of countermeasures, but that it is of limited help in the actual
decision situation with regard to urgent protective actions. At the moment,
the participants seemed to be willing to use RODOS as a data base and as a
supplementary calculator, i.e., for level 0, 1, and 2 support. Estimates of
health effects and costs were appreciated, but using RODOS in its present
form, for the actual decision-making part, was not seen to be appropriate. A
change in attitude is needed, which can be gained with good experience or
with examples of level 3 support. But as a planning tool the decision analysis
supported by the RODOS system has proved to provide much valuable
information which would be difficult to elicit using conventional exercises.
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